South Korea’s New Leadership : The Fate of a Stalled Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with ASEAN

Next week, on June 3rd, 2025, South Korea will make a pivotal decision by electing a new president. This follows a period of intense political upheaval triggered by former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law last year, which has fuelled ongoing tensions and widespread uncertainty. The five-months long impeachment saga has severely paralyzed political functions and hindered the country’s ability to engage strategically on the international stage. Even ASEAN has not been spared from the ripple effects.

South Korea's engagement with ASEAN has grown rapidly over the last 35 years. Seoul was granted sectoral dialogue partner status in 1989, and since then has deepened its commitment to the region. Institutionally, it has established the ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund (AKCF), the ASEAN-Korea Centre (AKC), and the only ASEAN Cultural House outside Southeast Asia. South Korea dispatched a Permanent Mission to ASEAN and boosted the partnership with the launch of the first ASEAN-focus initiative, the New Southern Policy (NSP). Building on this momentum, it has continued with the introduction of the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI) and during the 25th ASEAN-Republic of Korea Summit in Vientiane, Laos 2025 announced the elevation of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) with ASEAN.

The CSP represents the highest level of cooperation, placing South Korea on par with ASEAN's other CSP dialogue partners, including China, Japan, and the United States. Aside from continuing the existing collaborations, under CSP a re-emphasis was given on future-focused areas where South Korea holds a competitive edge, such as Electric Vehicle (EV), battery development, digital economy, and smart cities as well the expansion of strategic security coordination with ASEAN through defence ties and coordinating efforts on North Korea's nuclear issues. South Korea has also pledged to double its funding for ASEAN to $48 million by 2027, ensuring sustainable and long-term cooperation.

Undoubtedly, CSP holds promise for South Korea and ASEAN partnership. Due to the strong institutionalization at domestic level, ASEAN support remains bipartisan despite changes in the leaderships. Yet, the one major obstacle hindering comprehensive engagement with ASEAN comes from the external dynamic - the fragile security environment on the Korean Peninsula.

At its core, a state's primary interest is to ensure its security. While South Korea ranks among the world's leading economies, it remains technically at war, as the Korean War 1953 is still unresolved. Consequently, South Korea's main focus stays on the Northeast Asia region, a theme that has been evident throughout foreign policy across various administrations - Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik, Roh Moo-hyun's Hub and Balancer strategy, Park Geun-hye's Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) and even Moon Jae-in's Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation (NAPC) Platform. Additionally, in light of the increasing nuclear provocations conducted by Pyongyang, South Korea sought to bolster its security alliance posture with the U.S. This alliance imposes certain constraints on South Korea's foreign policy, rendering it highly responsive to changes coming from Washington.

The effect of Seoul’s ‘dependent’ pattern is observable in relations with ASEAN. Historically, there has been a tendency for attention on ASEAN to diminish rapidly whenever the South Korean government experiences a drastic shift in its security relations with the U.S. and North Korea. Considering this security bind, will CSP be effective in boosting a truly comprehensive partnership with ASEAN in the future? The answer will depend on the developments in North Korea and the United States.

In reality, the provocations by North Korea have intensified. In 2023 the country adopted a constitutional amendment to enshrine its nuclear identity. Since the middle of last year, North Korea has launched thousands of propaganda balloons to South Korea and detonated explosives on two major roads cutting off connection to South Korea. While this recent behaviour may be interpreted as an outlet for Kim Jong-un's frustrations, it has nonetheless contributed to rising tensions on the peninsula, which will demand South Korea's attention. Furthermore, Kim Jong-un has built a closer relationship with Russia. He announced the implementation of the “toughest” policy towards the U.S. and “welcomed” the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Seoul earlier this year with a missile launch.

View on the U.S. is also far from confident. Under Trump, South Korea was added to the list of “worst defender” and slapped with 25% tariffs on trade. Despite that since 2012 South Korea and the U.S. have completed the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), in which both countries have eliminated tariffs on most goods. As of last year, Korea’s effective tariff rate for U.S. imports was as low as 0.79% which led to questions about the basis on which Trump made this decision. Adding to the unease, Trump’s approach often sent mixed signals on political and security issues. During his previous term, he initially adopted a critical stance on South Korea's alliance burden and took a confrontational tone toward North Korea. However, his position shifted significantly, culminating in three historic meetings with the North Korean leader in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjom. On his second time, the pattern appears to be repeating itself. Before his election, Trump reiterated his views on the alliance burden, stressing that the "Money Machine" South Korea should increase its contribution. He denied that he would adopt a softer approach to North Korea but did not dismiss the fact that he maintains a personal rapport with Kim Jong-un. The ambiguity concerning the U.S. and North Korea crippled the robustness of South Korea engagement with ASEAN.

Despite the threat posed by North Korea and the diminishing credibility of the U.S., South Korea’s engagement with ASEAN is expected to remain robust, driven primarily by strong economic interests. However, we shouldn’t be satisfied. For a truly comprehensive strategic partnership to be realized, South Korea’s new leadership must retain its autonomy and move beyond the “dependent” limbo. This approach aligns with ASEAN’s vision under Malaysia’s 2025 presidency, themed “Inclusivity and Sustainability,” which emphasizes shared progress and the principle of leaving no one behind. By deepening regional cooperation through sustained dialogue and collaboration with its dialogue partners, including South Korea, ASEAN seeks to strengthen the foundations for a more integrated and resilient regional community.